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An Act of Decryption Doctrine: Clarifying the




New technology creates new legal challenges. With the coming of the 
information age, encryption has become ubiquitous.1 Almost anyone can 
easily acquire encryption software and use it to prevent unwanted third 
parties from reading one’s private information.2 Encryption can be 
incredibly powerful and nearly impossible to break.3 This technology 
presents special problems for law enforcement because criminals use it to 
hide their misdeeds.4 Due to encryption’s strength, sometimes the only way 
to gain access to the encrypted evidence is with the assistance of the 
accused.5 Compelling the accused to decrypt and assist in his or her own 
*   J.D. Candidate, 2015, Florida International University College of Law. I would like to thank 
those members of the FIU Law Review whose diligent efforts made this Comment ready for publication. 
I would also like to thank Clara Gomez and Amber Kornreich for their invaluable assistance. Finally, I 
am grateful for Professor Megan Fairlie for her guidance. 
1 See Dan Terzian, The Fifth Amendment, Encryption, and the Forgotten State Interest, 61 UCLA
L. REV. DISC. 298, 302-03 (2014). Prior to 2007, there were no cases addressing encryption. Id. Now
there is a “small universe.” Id.; see, e.g., In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 
29, 2007), rev’d, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 
424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter 
Doe III]; In re Decryption of a Seized Storage Sys., 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL 116993 (E.D. Wis. 
Apr. 19, 2013), overruled by 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL 153162 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013) 
[hereinafter Feldman I]; In re Decryption of a Seized Storage Sys., 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL 
153162 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013) [hereinafter Feldman II]; United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 
665 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
2 Encryption software is available commercially for a fairly low price. SYMANTIC, http://
www.symantec.com/drive-encryption (last visited Feb. 13, 2014); BITLOCKER DRIVE ENCRYPTION,
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-GB/windows7/products/features/bitlocker (lasted visited Feb. 13, 
2014); McAfee Endpoint Encryption, MCAFEE, http://www.mcafee.com/us/products/complete-data-
protection.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). Some software is even freely available on the Internet. See,
e.g., TRUECRYPT, http://www.truecrypt.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2014); GNU PRIVACY GUARD, http://
www.gnupg.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2014); AXCRYPT, http://www.axantum.com/axcrypt/ (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2014). 
3 See sources cited, infra note 32. 
4 See cases cited supra note 1; see also Statements by Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Before the Senate Committee, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER
(last visited Mar. 28, 2014), http://epic.org/crypto/legislation/freeh_797.html (discussing national 
security concerns with encryption). 
5 See, e.g., Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at * 2; Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340; Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 
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prosecution runs headlong into the Fifth Amendment Right Against 
Compelled Self-Incrimination. 
This Comment addresses the Fifth Amendment implications of 
compelled decryption. In addressing the issue of whether the government 
can compel someone to decrypt, courts have applied the “act of production 
doctrine.” This somewhat arcane doctrine was originally created to address 
whether the physical production of physical documents receives a Fifth 
Amendment privilege.6
This Comment will discuss encryption technology in section II.A, the 
act of production doctrine in section II.B, and the current case law in 
section II.C. In section III, this Comment will argue that the lower courts, in 
applying this “act of production” doctrine, have done so incorrectly. In 
particular, courts have failed to recognize the difference between the 
physical production of documents and compelled decryption. The resulting 
analysis is unduly confusing and provides more Fifth Amendment 
protection than what the Constitution requires. This Comment will propose 
an alternative application in section IV. Finally, in section V, this Comment 
will discuss the insurmountable problem of the accused’s refusal to decrypt. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. Encryption Background 
Encryption has its historical roots in antiquity and was famously used 
in World War II with the enigma machine.7 Prior to the Information Age, 
encryption was closely regulated.8 Following the popularization of the 
Internet, the government’s attempts at regulation ultimately failed.9
2d at 1234. But see Motion to Dismiss Application, at 1-2, United States v. Decryption of a Seized Data 
Storage Sys. (2:13-mj-00449), available at http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X1Q6MM164J82 
(dismissing a case after the government was able to decrypt the device). 
6 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 434 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring) (lamenting 
abandonment of the pragmatic Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), standard and its replacement 
with an “unduly technical focus on the act of production itself”); Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and 
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 77-78 (1986) (saying the act of 
production doctrine “has led the fifth amendment into a realm of almost metaphysical abstraction”); 
Robert P. Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors and Subpoenas for Incriminating Evidence: The 
Consequences and the Correction of Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 489 (2001) (calling the act 
of production doctrine “esoteric”); see, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. 391; United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 
(1984) [hereinafter Doe I]; Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) [hereinafter Doe II]; United States 
v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
7 CHRISTOF PAAR & JAN PELZL, UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY 2 (1998), available at http://
link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-642-04101-3. 
8 James Andrew, 2014 as the Year of Encryption: A (Very) Brief History of Encryption Policy,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Jan. 10, 2014), http://csis.org/publication/2014-
year-encryption-very-brief-history-encryption-policy.
9 See id.; Aaron Perkins, Comment, Encryption Use: Law and Anarchy on the Digital Frontier,
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Currently, some regulation of encryption exists, but for the most part, 
people’s access to encryption is unhindered.10 Through the use of easily 
accessible software one can encrypt both digital messages and the contents 
of an electronic storage device.11
The principles governing encrypting messages are nothing new.12 A 
simple “substitution cipher”13 such as the Caesar Cipher can encrypt the 
contents of a message. Take for example the following quote from Justice 
Jackson:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.14
Put through a simple substitution cipher, the quote becomes: 
Mj xlivi mw erc jmbih wxev mr syv gsrwxmxyxmsrep 
gsrwxippexmsr, mx mw xlex rs sjjmgmep, lmkl sv tixxc, ger 
tviwgvmfi alex wlepp fi svxlshsb mr tspmxmgw, rexmsrepmwq, 
vipmkmsr, sv sxliv qexxivw sj stmrmsr sv jsvgi gmxmdirw xs gsrjiww 
fc asvh sv egx xlimv jemxl xlivimr.15
The first quote is called the “plaintext”; the coded message is called 
the “cipher text.”16 The plaintext was “encrypted” using an algorithm where 
each character was moved to the right four characters (e.g., A became E; I 
became M).17 Decryption requires moving each character of the cipher text 
back four characters to put it in its original position.18
The cipher shown above is one of the simplest forms of encryption.19
One can most likely break it if given a few minutes and a piece of paper. 
However, asymmetrical public key encryption,20 such as “Pretty Good 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 1625, 1629-40 (2005); Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization,
13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 434-41 (2013).
10 See sources cited supra note 9. 
11 See sources cited supra note 2. 
12 See PAAR, supra note 7, at 2. 
13 See id. at 6 (“Historically [the substitution] type of cipher has been used many times, and it is a 
good illustration of basic cryptography.”). 
14 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
15 See PAAR, supra, note 7, at 18-19; Surveillance Self-Defense, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, https://ssd.eff.org/tech/encryption (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
16 See RAMAKRISHNA THURIMELLA & LEEMON C. BAIRD III, Network Security, in APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR CYBER SECURITY AND DEFENSE : INFORMATION ENCRYPTION AND CYPHERING 2 
(2011); PAAR, supra note 7, at 3-5. 
17 See THURMIMELLA, supra at note 16, 2; PAAR, supra note 7, at 6-7. 
18 See sources cited supra note 17. 
19 See PAAR, supra, note 7, at 6. 
20 See generally Richard T. Petras, Privacy for the Twenty-First Century: Cryptography, 94 THE
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Privacy” (PGP), a software program developed in 1991 by Philip 
Zimmerman, provides a far more secure system of encryption.21 Encryption 
software like PGP is both free online and simple to use.22
The information stored on a computer or electronic storage device can 
also be encrypted. Encrypted scrambles the contents of an electronic storage 
device, making it unreadable. There are a variety of encryption methods 
including full-disk encryption (FDE), file and folder encryption, virtual 
volume encryption, and hard disk password.23 FDE makes the entire device 
inaccessible and unreadable if the user does not know the correct 
password.24 Once the password has been entered, the device becomes 
readable.25 File or folder encryption makes individual files or folders 
inaccessible (e.g., encrypting “my documents”).26 Virtual volume 
encryption provides protection for information stored inside of a container 
(e.g., one’s C drive or a portable hard drive) and requires a password or key 
to access the container.27 Finally, a hard disk password is much like FDE 
except that where FDE uses software that interacts with one’s operating 
system, with hard disk encryption, the user’s computer hardware prompts 
the user for a key with no involvement from the operating system.28
While methods of cracking encryption exist,29 one of the problems 
facing law enforcement is that without the passphrase to an encrypted 
device, decryption becomes difficult or even impossible.30 Although 
MATHEMATICS TEACHER 689, 691-92 (2001). Asymmetrical key encryption requires both a public and a 
private key. PAAR, supra note 7, at 6. A message encoded with a public key can only be decoded with 
the private key. Id. As a result, the public key can be made public without risk that a third party could 
use it to decode encrypted messages. Id. at 7-8. This allows one to be conveniently contacted with 
encrypted messages with little risk of those messages being read by another. Id. at 7-8. 
21 See generally OPENPGP, http://www.openpgp.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
22 Id.
23 See generally Surveillance Self-Defense, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://
ssd.eff.org/tech/disk-encryption (last visted Feb. 13, 2014); Eoghan Casey et al., The Growing Impact on 
Full Disk Encryption on Digital Forensics, DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 8, 130 (2011); KAREN SCARFONE,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-111, GUIDE
TO STORAGE ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY FOR END USER DEVICES 3-1 - 3-4 (2007).





29 See generally J. Alex Halderman et al., Lest We Remember, Cold Boot Attack on Encryption 
Keys, Proc. 2008 USENIX Security Symposium (2008), available at http://citpsite.s3-website-us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/oldsite-htdocs/pub/coldboot.pdf (cold-boot attack); MATT CURTIN, BRUTE FORCE:
CRACKING THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD 23-34 (2005) (brute-force attack); Casey et al., supra
note 23, at 132-34 (live acquisition technique). 
30 Casey et al., supra note 23, at 130; Terzian, supra note 1, at 303-04; see, e.g., In re Boucher,
No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (Nov. 29, 2007); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 
2012).
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encryption can keep one’s private information private, it can also bar law 
enforcement’s attempts to investigate crimes involving computers.31
B.  The Modern Interpretation of the Fifth Amendment  
 Self-Incrimination Clause 
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, “No 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”32 The Fifth Amendment does not grant one an unfettered “right to 
remain silent.”33 Instead, before the privilege attaches, an act must satisfy 
three elements. The act must be: (1) compelled, (2) incriminating, and (3) 
testimonial.34
A seemingly obvious, but important, point is that these elements are 
conjunctive.35 The government can, therefore, compel the accused to 
incriminate himself or herself—so long as the compelled act is not 
testimonial.36 Similarly, one can incriminate oneself with a testimonial 
communication, but if the government does not compel it, it is not 
privileged.37 The government may also compel a testimonial act so long as 
one does not incriminate oneself when making it.38
31 See sources cited supra note 2, 5. 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
33 See Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 214 n.12 (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-
14 (1973) (holding that compelling one to speak for the purposes of a voice exemplar was not 
privileged).
34 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). 
35 Id.
36 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976); see, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757 (1966) (permitting the government to compel a defendant to provide an incriminating blood 
sample because it was non-testimonial); see also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910) (“But 
the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of 
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his 
body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a 
prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover, we need not consider how far a 
court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself. For when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or 
by order, and even if the order goes too far, the evidence, if material, is competent.”). 
37 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10; Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1984); see also Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (noting that one may waive one’s Miranda rights, but the waiver 
must be, among other things, voluntary); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that the 
defendant’s confession was voluntary when he approached the police during a psychotic episode and 
confessed to a murder). 
38 See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (subpoenas in federal civil proceedings); Fed. R. Crim. P. 17 
(subpoenas in federal criminal proceedings). 
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1.  Element 1: Compelled
To satisfy the compulsion element, the government must in some way 
coerce action.39 When an act is done voluntarily, this element is not 
present.40 For example, with a personal paper or document, the voluntary 
act of writing the document would not be compelled, but a government 
subpoena to produce the document would be.41 Thus, if someone writes in 
his or her diary “I killed so-and-so” and the government seizes the diary, 
then the diary receives no Fifth Amendment protection because its creation 
was voluntary.42 However, if the government were to coerce the same 
person to sign a confession saying much the same thing—or even affirm the 
fact that he or she wrote the diary—then the compulsion element would be 
present.43
2.  Element 2: Incriminating 
The incrimination element requires that an act either incriminate or 
lead to the sicvoery of incriminating evidence.44 One does not necessarily 
need to have committed a wrongdoing; even the innocent may fear self-
incrimination.45 But the danger of self-incrimination must not be merely 
“imagined and unsubstantial.”46 Furthermore, to satisfy this element, the 
39 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966) (holding that to avoid the danger of compelled self-incrimination, the accused must be warned of 
his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights). 
40 Doe I, 465 U.S. at 610-11; see also South Dakota v. Neville 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (holding one 
is not compelled to refuse an alcohol test although the results of the test tended to incriminate). 
41 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-12. In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether 
the defendant’s tax records were privileged. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. In Fisher, the taxpayer’s 
accountant produced the records and the taxpayer’s lawyer was in current possession of the records. Id.
The Court found that the creation tax records were not compelled because the government did not 
compel the records’ creation. Id.
42 Cf. Doe I, 465 U.S. at 610 (“Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no 
compulsion is present.”) (footnote omitted). 
43 Id. at 611; see also Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924) (“[T]he 
requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a 
promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made. A 
confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to police officers, while in custody, 
and in answer to an examination conducted by them. But a confession obtained by compulsion must be 
excluded whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was 
applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.”) (footnotes omitted).
44 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 
38 (2000); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (“The privilege afforded not only 
extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but 
likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the 
claimant for a federal crime.”). 
45 Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001). 
46 Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917) (“[W]e are of opinion that the danger to 
be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the 
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witness must incriminate himself or herself. That is, if one’s testimony just 
incriminates someone else, the incrimination element is not satisfied.47
3.  Element 3: Testimonial 
The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between action that is 
testimonial versus action that is non-testimonial.48 Testimonial acts require 
one to make use of “the contents of his own mind.”49 Testimonial acts are 
often verbal communications used for their contents, such as statements 
made during custodial interrogation,50 before a grand jury,51 or during a 
trial.52 Verbal communication will almost always be testimonial.53
Physical or real evidence is not privileged.54 For example, in 
Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination did not apply when the government obtained a 
ordinary course of things—not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to 
some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer 
it to influence his conduct. We think that a merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary 
course of law and such as no reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered to obstruct 
the administration of justice.”); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 (1968); see also Hoffman,
341 U.S. at 486 (“The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so 
doing he would incriminate himself—his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of 
incrimination.”).
47 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is a 
personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him. As 
Mr. Justice Holmes put it: ‘A party is privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its 
production.’ The Constitution explicitly prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness ‘against 
himself’: it necessarily does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another.”) (citations 
omitted); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 225 (1975) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the defendant, does not extend to the testimony or 
statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial.”). 
48 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 
408 (1976); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000). 
49 Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988) (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957); 
See, e.g., Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43 (using contents of the mind to put together documents in response to 
subpoena is testimonial); Curcio, 354 U.S. at 128 (testifying orally to the whereabouts of records 
required the witness to use the contents of his own mind); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582, 597 (1990) (footnotes omitted) (“Whenever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to 
communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the ‘trilemma’ of 
truth, falsity, or silence, and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity) contains a testimonial 
component.”).
50 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
51 See, e.g., Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957). 
52 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
53 Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988) (“There are very few instances in which a verbal statement, 
either oral or written, will not convey information or assert facts. The vast majority of verbal statements 
thus will be testimonial and, to that extent at least, will fall within the privilege.”) (footnotes omitted). 
54 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 (1966) (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 
245, 252-53 (1910)); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1990); see also United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967) (standing in a police lineup non-testimonial). 
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blood sample from the defendant.55 Even one’s verbal and written acts may 
be non-testimonial so long as they are used for their physical characteristics 
and not their substantive content.56 For example, voice exemplars57 and 
handwriting exemplars58 are non-testimonial because they are used for their 
physical properties and not what is said.59
The difference between a testimonial act and a non-testimonial act is 
the difference between requiring a defendant to answer an interrogatory and 
requiring a defendant to provide a handwriting exemplar.60 Both can 
incriminate him or her, but with the former, the defendant is required to 
make use of the “contents of his own mind.”61
Physical actions may, however, make implicit testimonial 
communications.62 The following sections address the question of whether 
being physically compelled to produce documents is testimonial. 
i.  The Act of Production Doctrine 
The Court has established the “act of production” doctrine in response 
to the issue of whether the production of a physical object (such as a 
personal or business paper) is a testimonial act. The lower courts have been 
applying this “act of production” doctrine to compelled decryption cases, so 
understanding it is of particular importance.63 First, I will describe it 
generally and then discuss the small number of Supreme Court cases 
applying the doctrine. 
The Court has distinguished between the content of a paper and the act
of producing the paper.64 While the content of a paper is certainly 
testimonial, its creation is voluntary (i.e., it lacks the compulsion element 
and is therefore not privileged).65 The act of producing a paper is 
55 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765. 
56 See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 597 (physical qualities of speech not testimonial). 
57 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1973); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 222 (1967) (holding that requiring the accused to speak for identification purposes was non-
testimonial).
58 United States v. Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967). 
59 See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590-92. 
60 Compare United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 41 (2000) (stating that requiring a defendant 
to produce several thousand records was “tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories” and was 
therefore testimonial), with Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266-67 (stating that a handwriting exemplar, taken for 
its physical characteristics, was non-testimonial). 
61 See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957). 
62 See section II.C.i infra.
63 See section III.C infra.
64 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36. 
65 See United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1976); Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) 
(O’Conner, J., concurring) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents 
of private papers of any kind”); accord Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; Baltimore City 
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compelled, but whether it is testimonial is a more difficult question.66
No bright line rule exists to determine whether the production of a 
paper is a testimonial act.67 Instead it depends on the “facts and 
circumstances” of each case.68 Whether the production of a paper is 
testimonial depends on whether that production makes implicit, testimonial 
communications.69 Normally, when one produces a paper, one tacitly 
admits to the government that the paper exists and that one has control over 
it.70 These tacit admissions may make the physical production of the paper 
testimonial.71
I say “may” because the government has the opportunity to “rebut” the 
claim that the production is testimonial.72 The government may “produce 
evidence that possession, existence, and authentication [is] a ‘foregone 
conclusion.’”73 In other words, the accused may claim that he or she is 
making a testimonial communication, but if the government already knows 
what the production would implicitly communicate, then the production 
loses its testimonial quality and becomes a non-testimonial act.74
It is worth acknowledging that the exact meaning of “foregone 
conclusion” has proven an interpretative challenge because the Court has 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990) (“[A] person may not claim the 
Amendment’s protections based upon the incrimination that may result from the contents or nature of 
the thing demanded.”). The rule that private papers are not privileged was established first in United
States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). In that case, the Court brought the prior precedent of Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), into question. See Fisher, 425 U.S. 408-09. Boyd had held that the 
contents of private papers were privileged because using one’s private books and papers was not 
“substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.” Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-35. 
The Court distinguished Boyd by pointing out that the papers were the product of the accountant’s 
efforts and not the accused. The Court, in Fisher, left open the question of whether its act of production 
doctrine would apply to individually produced papers. 425 U.S. at 414; see also id. at 421 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (urging the Court not to extend Fisher to private papers).  
66 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (stating that in a compelled production case, the “more difficult” issue 
is whether production is testimonial). 
67 Id. Compare id. (finding the production of records to be non-testimonial after a factual 
inquiry), with Doe I, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (finding the production of records to be testimonial after a 
factual inquiry) and United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (finding the production of records to 
be testimonial after a factual inquiry). 
68 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. 
69 Id.
70 See Doe I, 465 U.S. at 613 n.11 (not showing disagreement with the position that subpoenas to 
compel production “with few exceptions” have communicative aspects). 
71 See, e.g., Doe I, 465 U.S. 605; Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27. 
72 Doe I, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13. 
73 Id. (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411) (“[The defendant] argued that by producing the records, 
he would tacitly admit their existence and his possession. . . . These allegations were sufficient to 
establish a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is not to say that the Government 
was foreclosed from rebutting respondent’s claim by producing evidence that possession, existence, and 
authentication were a ‘foregone conclusion.’”). 
74 See id.; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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failed to define it clearly.75 Commentators and courts have struggled to 
conceptualize the doctrine.76 In addition to the conceptual difficulties, the 
Supreme Court has not answered the question of how much evidence the 
government must have before something becomes a “foregone 
conclusion.”77
a. Fisher v. United States
The act of production doctrine was borne in United States v. Fisher. In 
this case, the defendant, a taxpayer, was facing both civil and criminal 
liability under federal income tax laws.78 The taxpayer’s tax documents had 
75 Mosteller, supra note 6, at 508-09 (“[T]he Supreme Court has never given real definition to 
[the foregone conclusion] doctrine.”); Alito, supra note 6, at 49 (“The Court also left substantial doubt 
about what it meant by ‘a foregone conclusion.’”); Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled 
Production of Personal Documents After United States v. Hubbell - New Protection for Private Papers?,
29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 167 (2002) (“[O]n the most difficult and uncertain point—the question of when 
the foregone conclusion doctrine applies to an act of production of documents—the Court once again 
declined to provide a definitive answer.”). 
76 I will not be addressing this difficult question. For a sampling of the variety of the views on 
this subject see generally Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment 
Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 32 (1987) (“[W]hen an implicit as opposed to an explicit communication is 
involved, it is necessary to consider whether the government is really asking a ‘question’ through the 
subpoena. Granted, the defendant’s response to a documentary subpoena always reveals that the item 
does or does not exist; the government cannot eliminate the implicit question about the document’s 
existence no matter how it phrases the subpoena’s demand. But if the government already knows the 
answer to that question and is truly uninterested in the implicit answer provided by production, the 
witness’ gratuitous communication of it should not violate the Fifth Amendment. In short, the Fisher
decision suggests that constitutional rights are not violated by implicit communications that are inherent 
in a response to a documentary subpoena where those communications are unwanted because, though 
technically admissible, they are not substantially relevant to the prosecution’s case given its other 
evidence.”) (footnotes omitted); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1343 n.19 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that the 
foregone conclusion doctrine bears a family resemblance to the independent source doctrine from use 
and derivative-use immunity cases); Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 188 (2007) 
(“The government’s prior knowledge, however, may be relevant to show that it had an independent 
source for the information and, thus, did not make derivative use of the act of production and will not 
make use of it at trial.”); Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained 
and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 277-89 (2004) (arguing that the foregone 
conclusion doctrine relates to the cognitive process of the witness and not the knowledge of the 
government).
77 See sources cited supra note 76. Several lower courts have adopted the “reasonable 
particularity” standard to determine when something is a “foregone conclusion.” Under this standard, 
the government must know with reasonable particularity the location and existence of the documents it 
subpoenas. See United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In Hubbell, the lower 
appellate court, the D.C. Circuit, had adopted the reasonable particularity standard, but the Supreme 
Court declined to pass judgment on its validity. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 33, 44 
(2000). Regardless, courts in the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits still apply the reasonable 
particularity standard post-Hubbell. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 
1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); Ponds, 454 F.3d at 324; Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1344 (11th Cir. 
2012); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated Apr. 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). 
78 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 393-94 (1976). 
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been prepared by his accountant, and the taxpayer gave them to his 
attorney.79 The government subpoenaed those documents.80 The taxpayer’s 
attorney asserted the privilege against self-incrimination on his client’s 
behalf.81
The Court considered the issue of whether a subpoena to produce the 
tax records was a testimonial act.82 It noted that the compelled production of 
records does not require oral testimony or require the taxpayer to “restate, 
repeat, or affirm the truth the contents of the documents sought.”83
However, production of the tax records may have implicit testimonial 
qualities.84 In some cases, production may implicitly communicate that the 
records exist and are controlled by the taxpayer.85 Production may also 
authenticate the documents.86
But then the Court turned abruptly from what the defendant may 
implicitly communicate to what the government knew about what is 
implicitly communicated.87 The Court found that the government could 
independently confirm and verify the existence of the taxpayer’s records; 
the taxpayer’s accountant had created the records, and the records were the 
kind that an accountant would normally create.88 The production would not 
tell the government anything it did not already know and would not 
increase the “sum total” of the government’s knowledge.89 Therefore, the 
Court found that production of the records to be insufficiently testimonial to 
meet the Fifth Amendment’s “testimonial” element.90
The Fisher analysis was, apparently, part of the Court’s jurisprudence 
all along.91 The Fisher Court said that the “act of production” analysis even 
applies to things like handwriting exemplars.92 When one provides a 
79 Id.
80 Id. at 394-95. 
81 Id. at 395-96. While irrelevant to this discussion, Fisher also held that, although the attorney 
was an “agent” of the taxpayer, under Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the attorney could 
not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege on the taxpayer’s behalf. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 397-98; see also 
cases cited supra note 49. 
82 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402-14. 
83 Id. at 409; see also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) (holding that a grand jury 
could compel a custodian of records to produce a company’s records but not to orally testify as to more 
records if that testimony could incriminate). 
84 Id. at 410-11. 
85 Id.
86 Id. at 412-13, 413 n.12; see generally FED. R. EVID. 901 (Authentication and Identification). 




91 See id. at 411-12. 
92 Id.; see United States v. Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (holding that a handwriting 
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handwriting exemplar, one implicitly admits that one can write and admits 
that what he or she is providing is his or her handwriting.93 But the 
government already knows that people can write; it is a “truism.”94 And the 
government already knows that the exemplar is someone’s handwriting; it 
is “self-evident.”95 Thus, the things communicated were “foregone 
conclusions.”96 This would mean that this act of production analysis is at 
work in more than just cases where one is compelled to produce documents. 
b. United States v. Doe (Doe I)
Eight years later, in United States v. Doe97 (Doe I), the Court revisited 
the act of production doctrine.98 In this case, the government sought to 
compel records from the defendant with a grand jury subpoena.99 The 
defendant claimed that the content of the records was privileged, and the act 
of producing the records was privileged.100 The lower courts sided with the 
defense on both claims.101
On the first point, the Court rejected the claim that the content of the 
records was privileged.102 As discussed in section II.B.1, if a record is 
created voluntarily, it lacks the element of “compulsion.”103 The defendant 
argued that it should make a difference that the records in his own case 
were personally created, but in Fisher, the taxpayer’s accountant had 
created the records.104 The Court rejected this as a distinction without a 
difference and found that both records were created voluntarily.105
On the second point however, the Court sided with the defendant.106
The Court relied on the findings of the lower courts that the production 
would involve a testimonial communication.107 It also sided with the lower 
courts’ finding that the government had no knowledge of whether the 
exemplar is non-testimonial).




97 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
98 Id.
99 Id. at 606-07. 
100 Id. at 608. 
101 Id.
102 Id. at 612. 
103 See id. 611-12.
104 Id. at 608. 
105 Id. at 611-12. 
106 Id. at 617. 
107 See id. 613-14, 613 n.11. 
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compelled documents existed and were in the defendant’s control.108
The Court, in dicta, helped to clarify the somewhat perplexing act of 
production doctrine from Fisher.109 This dictum provides a framework for 
the act of production and foregone conclusion analyses.110 First the one 
seeking to claim the privilege must show that the compelled production has 
implicit testimonial qualities.111 Then, the burden shifts to the government 
to rebut the claim of privilege.112 To “rebut” this privilege, the government 
must produce evidence that the testimonial qualities implicitly 
communicated are already a foregone conclusion and therefore non-
testimonial.113
c. Doe v. United States (Doe II)
Four years after Doe I, the Court decided another case, Doe v. United 
States114 (Doe II), again addressing the act of production doctrine.115 As part 
of a grand jury investigation, the government sought records in the 
possession of foreign banks.116 The government could not access those 
records without the defendant’s assistance.117 It needed the defendant to 
execute a directive to release the foreign bank records and compelled him to 
do so with a grand jury subpoena.118 The directive was carefully written as 
to not make reference to a specific account, to a specific bank, to the 
existence of an account, or to an account owned by the defendant.119 Thus 
signing the directive did not require the defendant to admit anything.120 The 
defendant refused to sign the directive on self-incrimination grounds.121 The 
Court rejected the defendant’s claim and found that it was not sufficiently 
108 Id. at 613-14. 
109 See id. at 613 n.11. 
110 See id.
111 The Court, although it did not explicitly show agreement with the district court, did not 
express disagreement with the lower court’s statement that “[w]ith few exceptions enforcement of the 
subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession, and 
that they are authentic.” Id. at 613 n.11 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
This seems to show that this initial burden is easily met in most cases. 
112 Id.
113 Id. The Court did not say what evidentiary standard the government would need to meet. See
id.
114 487 U.S. 201 (1988). 
115 Id.
116 Id. at 202-03. 
117 Id. at 203-04. 
118 Id.
119 Id. at 204-05, 215. 
120 Id.
121 Id. at 204. 
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testimonial.122
The Court reaffirmed Fisher, saying that “an accused’s communication 
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose 
information.”123 The execution would not assert or disclose any information 
itself.124 Instead, it would just open up “a potential source of evidence.”125
Thus, compelled execution of the directive would be more like a 
handwriting or voice exemplar because it lacked testimonial significance.126
Significantly, unlike either Doe I or Fisher, the Court did not require 
the government to know what the directive would produce.127 The Court 
looked narrowly to whether signing the directive would require the 
defendant to “make a statement.”128 The directive made no statement as to 
whether evidence existed, and it did not “point the Government towards 
hidden accounts or otherwise provide information that will assist the 
prosecution in uncovering evidence.”129 Therefore, while incriminating, the 
directive was not testimonial.130 Consequently, the defendant could not 
claim the privilege against self-incrimination.131
d. United States v. Hubbell
The last time the Court addressed the act of production doctrine was in 
United States v. Hubbell.132 Here, the defendant had entered into a plea 
bargain where he would provide the government with information relating 
to an ongoing investigation.133 The prosecutor served the defendant with a 
subpoena calling for the production of eleven categories of documents.134
The defendant then invoked his Fifth Amendment Privilege.135 In response, 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002,136 the prosecution provided the defendant 
122 Id. at 219. 
123 Id. at 210. 
124 Id.




129 Id. at 217. 
130 Id. at 217 n.15. 
131 Id.
132 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
133 Id. at 30. 
134 Id. at 31. 
135 Id.
136 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994). 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to 
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to 
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
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with immunity for the production of the papers.137 The defendant then 
produced 13,120 documents.138 These documents led to a prosecution, 
despite the grant of immunity.139 The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed 
the indictment because 18 U.S.C. § 6002 immunized the defendant from 
future prosecutions.140
The government argued that it did not need to offer immunity in the 
first place because the production was insufficiently testimonial.141 The 
Court rejected this however, saying that the production of the 13,120 
documents “was tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories asking 
the witness to disclose the existence and location of particular documents 
fitting certain broad descriptions.”142
The government then argued that the production of the documents was 
insufficiently testimonial because the defendant’s control over the 
documents was a foregone conclusion.143 The Court rejected this argument 
because prior to the defendant’s production of the documents, the 
government did not have “any prior knowledge” that the documents existed. 
Because the facts of this case were so unfavorable to the government, the 
court failed to explain what it meant by “foregone conclusion,” except that 
“whatever the scope of this ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale, the facts of this 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House, 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an 
order issued under this title, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order 
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other 
information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly 
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the 
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. 
137 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 31. 
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 46. In Kastigar, the Court interpreted this grant of immunity to be co-extensive with the 
privilege against self-incrimination such that the government cannot use either the testimony or the 
derivatives of the testimony in a future criminal action. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S 441, 453 
(1972). The only permissible way that the government could successfully prosecute subsequent to 
granting immunity is if it is based on information independent of the immunized testimony. Id. at 460-
61. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 does granted not total immunity to all subsequent prosecutions (i.e., “transactional 
immunity”). Id. at 462. Rather, once immunity has been granted, the burden shifts to the prosecution to 
show that proposed evidence comes from an independent source. Id. at 461-62. In Hubbell, the 
documents themselves were not going to be used against the defendant, they were the “first step in a 
chain of evidence” leading to the indictment. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42. Thus the government had made 
derivational use of the documents and could not show that it had attained the information necessary for 
these second prosecutions from an independent source. Id. at 45-46. 
141 Id. at 44. 
142 Id. at 41. 
143 Id. at 44. 
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case plainly fall outside of it.”144
C.  Encryption Case Law 
Few courts have thus far had the opportunity to address whether the 
compelled decryption of an electronic device is testimonial.145 The courts 
that have addressed the problem have made use of the act of production 
doctrine discussed in II.B.3. These “compelled production” cases are 
factually distinct from one another and so this Comment will briefly discuss 
the factual and procedural circumstances of the cases and how they have 
applied the act of production doctrine to compelled decryption. 
1. In re Boucher
In re Boucher146 was one of the first encryption cases. On December 
17, 2006, the defendant passed through a routine border checkpoint and an 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent searched his vehicle.147
Within the vehicle, the ICE agent found a laptop computer.148 He opened it 
to discover several thousand images, some of which were pornographic.149
Among the prodigious amount of pornography, he found a file titled “2yo 
getting raped during diaper change.” He was unable to open it.150 However, 
he could see that the file had been opened in the past month.151
A second ICE agent was then called in, this one an expert in child 
pornography.152 He read the defendant his Miranda rights, which were 
waived.153 The defendant told the agent that he downloaded a lot of 
144 Id.; see also Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1984) (holding that the defendant’s possession and 
control of records was not a foregone conclusion but neglecting to further define the doctrine). Engaging 
in a bit of speculation as to what went in chambers on this point, Justice Stevens wrote both the dissent 
in Doe II and the majority opinion in Hubbell. Justice Stevens all but ignores Doe II (aside from his 
dissent), favoring Doe I and Fisher. Appearing to be no fan of the foregone conclusion doctrine, he 
dismisses the foregone conclusion saying “this ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale” with foregone 
conclusion in scare quotes. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44. Whether this marks a sign that a future Court 
would abandon the foregone conclusion approach is worth considering. Also worth considering is the 
fact that Justices Scalia and Thomas would abandon the entire act of production analysis in favor of a 
rule saying that the accused should never need to assist the government in one’s own prosecution. See
id., at 49-54. But these considerations are outside the scope of this Comment. 
145 See cases sited supra note 1. 
146 No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007). 
147 Id. at *1. See generally United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (establishing the 
border search exception to probable cause). 





153 Id. See generally cases cited supra note 31. 
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pornography, and occasionally, would mistakenly download child 
pornography, but he would delete it upon discovery.154 The agent then 
asked the defendant to show him the pornography.155 The defendant 
complied and entered in a password into his “drive Z”—the agent did not 
see what the password was.156 The agent looked through the computer and a 
found a video titled “preteen bondage,” which appeared to depict an 
underage girl.157 After finding even more child pornography, the defendant 
was then arrested and the computer was powered down.158
When the computer was powered back on, law enforcement found it 
encrypted using PGP encryption software.159 The software made the disk 
unreadable despite a Secret Service forensics expert’s best efforts.160 It 
could take years to decrypt.161
The government then subpoenaed the defendant to hand over all 
documents that reflected the password to the laptop.162 The court did not 
address the demand for papers because the government refined its request at 
a hearing and demanded that the defendant enter the password himself.163
The government promised not to use the defendant’s act of entering in the 
password against him.164
The magistrate first determined that the act of entering in the password 
would be testimonial.165 The act of entering in the password would 
communicate both the contents of the defendant’s mind and that he had 
access to the device.166 It did not matter to the court that the government 
had promised not to look at the password because the defendant would still 
implicitly communicate that he knew the password regardless of whether 
the government learned the actual password.167
The magistrate concluded that the government did not meet its burden 
154 Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1. 
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at *2. 
158 Id.
159 Id. For more information on the software used in this case, see generally Encryption Family,
SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.com/encryption (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
160 Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2. 
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. The flaws in this request are obvious under Hubbell, 530 U.S. 26 (2000). The government 
had no idea if any papers existed; therefore production of the papers would implicitly communicate the 
existence of such papers—a testimonial act. 
164 Id.
165 Id. at *3-4. 
166 Id.
167 Id.
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under the foregone conclusion doctrine.168 The court interpreted the 
government’s requests as either for the password itself or for the production 
of the files from drive Z.169 A request for the password itself would be a 
request for something purely communicative and so the act of production 
doctrine would not apply.170 The request for the files from drive Z would 
fail because the government only knew of some of the device’s files and did 
not know the entire contents of the device.171 Therefore, decryption would 
increase the “sum total” of the government’s knowledge. 
In In re Boucher172 (Boucher II), the government appealed the 
magistrate’s order to the district court judge.173 This time, the government 
had refined its request to just be for the unencrypted version of “drive z.”174
The district court found that the government’s knowledge of the drive’s 
existence, the defendant’s control of the drive, and the drive’s authenticity 
was a foregone conclusion.175 Therefore, the decryption of the device could 
be compelled.176 The district court disposed of the magistrate’s argument, 
saying that the government did not need to know of the incriminating 
contents of the files.177
2. United States v. Fricosu
United States v. Fricosu,178 a case from the District of Colorado, also 
resulted in the defendant being compelled to decrypt because of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine.179 In this case, the prosecution sought files 
contained in an encrypted laptop computer, which resisted FBI attempts at 
decryption.180 The prosecution petitioned the court for a writ compelling the 
168 Id. at *5-6. 
169 Id. at *6. 
170 Id.; see also United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668-69 (E.D. Mich. 2010) 
(holding that the government could not compel the defendant to communicate the password of an 
encrypted device because it was not a physical production). 
171 Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473 at *1. 
172 No: 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
173 Id.
174 Id. at *2. 
175 Id. at *4. 
176 Id.
177 Id. at *3. On this point the Boucher II court relied on the controlling Second Circuit precedent 
of In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), which held 
that the government was not required to know the contents of an allegedly altered calendar when it could 
state with reasonable particularity the existence and location of the calendar. In re Jury Subpoena, 1 
F.3d at 93. Thus, the Court stated that the government was not required to know the content of 
individual files so long as it could show that the files existed. Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *3. 
178 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012). 
179 Id. at 1237-38. 
180 Id. at 1234. 
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defendant to decrypt the computer and assist with the execution of the 
warrant.181
The district court considered two issues.182 The first was whether the 
government knew of the existence and location of the computer’s files.183
The court relied in large part on the Boucher II court’s analysis to find that 
the government did not need to be able to know specific content of the files; 
knowing the “existence and location” of the computer’s files was 
sufficient.184
The second issue was whether the government could show that the 
defendant could access the computer.185 On this point the court found: 
“[T]he government has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the [device] belongs to [the defendant], or, in the alternative, 
that she was its sole or primary user, who, in any event, can access the 
encrypted contents of that laptop computer.”186 The court relied on the 
following facts: (1) the computer had been seized from the defendant’s 
room; (2) the computer was named “RS.WORKGROUP.Romana” 
(Romana being the defendant’s first name); and (3) the agents had recorded 
a conversation between the defendant and her husband where the defendant 
admitted to owning and being able to access the laptop.187 Therefore, the 
court found that the compelled decryption of the laptop did not violate the 
Fifth Amendment. 
181 Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1949). 
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all 
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to 
the usages and principles of law. 
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which 
has jurisdiction. 




186 Id. In my research, the Fricosu court is the only court to identify a preponderance of the 
evidence standard as the burden the government must meet before it may compel decryption. The 
Fricosu court does not cite any authority in stating that the government must meet this burden. No other 
court has addressed or accepted this standard of proof requirement. However, as the Eleventh Circuit has 
noted, the foregone conclusion doctrine bears a resemblance to the independent source doctrine from 
Kastigar. See Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1343 n.19 (11th Cir. 2012); see also supra notes 135, 138. Several 
courts have applied a preponderance of the evidence standard to the question of whether the discovery of 
evidence following a grant of immunity stems from an independent source. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 9 F.3d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1993); cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (applying a 
preponderance of the evidence standard to the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule). 
So perhaps that is where the evidentiary standard in Fricosu comes from. 
187 See Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1237. 
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3. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011 
(Doe III)
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011188 (Doe
III) stands as the only circuit court case to consider the issue of compelled 
decryption, and the only case, in any jurisdiction, where the defendant was 
not compelled to decrypt. This Eleventh Circuit case has also provided the 
most detailed analysis of the act of production doctrine’s application to 
encryption.189
In 2010, the FBI investigated a YouTube.com account suspected of 
sharing child pornography.190 The user of the account accessed the account 
from three different internet protocol addresses (IP address). The FBI linked 
these addresses to three different hotels.191 The only common individual 
staying in the hotels during the relevant times was the defendant.192 The FBI 
executed a search warrant and seized two laptops and five external hard 
drives.193 However, the hard drives had been encrypted using TruCrypt’s 
Hidden Volume software.194 One of the features of the Hidden Volume 
software is that it prevents one from determining whether an encrypted 
device is empty or full.195 The device could be either full of information or 
completely empty (aside from the encryption) and no one could know the 
difference.196
The government sought to subpoena the decryption of a device that it 
suspected had child pornography on it.197 The defendant refused and 
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination.198 The prosecution then 
188 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012). 
189 This case also misreads the act of production cases. See section III. 




194 Id. See generally Hidden Volume, TRUECRYPT, http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume
(last visited Mar., 25, 2014) (“It may happen that you are forced by somebody to reveal the password to 
an encrypted volume. There are many situations where you cannot refuse to reveal the password (for 
example, due to extortion). Using a so-called hidden volume allows you to solve such situations without 
revealing the password to your volume.”) (footnotes omitted). 
195 Id. The TrueCrypt hidden volume basically allows the user to create a “Russian nesting doll” 
of encryption. See id. (“[F]ree space on any TrueCrypt volume is always filled with random data when 
the volume is created and no part of the (dismounted) hidden volume can be distinguished from random 
data.”) (footnotes omitted). The software encrypts a volume, resulting it that volume appearing to be 
random information. Id. Then a sub-part of the encrypted drive is encrypted again, but because the 
volumes appear to just be random data, despite the number of times it has been encrypted, it is difficult 
to impossible to determine whether the sub-drive is full or empty. Id.
196 Id.; see also Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340 (discussing TrueCrypt software). 
197 Id. at 1339. 
198 Id.
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offered use immunity199 for the act of decryption but not for the derivational 
evidence.200 The defendant again refused, claiming that use immunity 
would be insufficient to protect him from incriminating himself.201 The 
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the defendant and held that the defendant’s act 
of decryption was testimonial and the grant of use immunity was 
insufficient to immunize the defendant’s action.202
The Eleventh Circuit first provided a broad overview of the Supreme 
Court’s act of production doctrine.203 It identified that an act is non-
testimonial if either the compulsion is merely with regard to a physical act 
and is non-communicative or the compulsion is communicative but this 
communication is a foregone conclusion.204
The court held first that decryption was a testimonial act.205 Decryption 
would require the defendant to admit that he knew the files existed and 
knew the location of the files.206 Decryption would also require him to 
admit to possessing the files, controlling the files, being able to access the 
files, and being able to decrypt the device.207
The court then turned to whether the implicit testimony was a foregone 
conclusion.208 On this point, the court put heavy emphasis on the 
government’s expert whom, during a hearing, was unable to say whether 
the encrypted device actually had anything on it.209 The most he could say 
was that the device could have files on it, but TrueCrypt’s Hidden Volume 
functionality prevented one from determining whether a device was full or 
empty.210
The court held that the foregone conclusion rationale was inapplicable 
because the government could not show that it knew any files even existed 
199 For a general description of immunity, see generally supra notes 135, 138 and accompanying 
text. Use immunity is distinct from use and derivational use immunity. See Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1338. 
Use immunity is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment, id. at 1350, while derivational use 
immunity is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment Privilege, see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 
441, 462 (1972). 
200 Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1338. 
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1341. 
203 Id. at 1341-46. 
204 Id. at 1346. 
205 Id.; see also id. at 1341 n.13 (“If the decryption of the hard drives would not constitute 
testimony, one must ask, ‘Why did the Government seek, and the district court grant, immunity for 
Doe’s decryption?’ The answer is obvious: Doe’s decryption would be testimonial.”). 
206 Id. at 1346. 
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 1340, 1345. 
210 Id.; see supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 220 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 220 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
18 - JARONE_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 11:36 PM
788 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:767 
(let alone where they were located).211 The government argued that the files 
could exist, but the court dismissed the argument stating that “the 
Government physically possesses the media devices, but it does not know 
what, if anything, is held on the encrypted drives.”212 Nor could the 
government show that it knew within any degree of certainty that the 
defendant could decrypt.213 Thus, the court reasoned, the case was like 
Hubbell and unlike Fisher because the government lacked knowledge of the 
encrypted files.214
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished, but did not show disagreement 
with, both Boucher II and Fricosu. In those cases, unlike this one, the 
prosecution at least had information that something was on the computer.215
The Eleventh Circuit seemed to agree with the other courts that the 
government did not need to go so far as to show knowledge of the specific 
content of other devices.216 But the government at least needed to know that 
something existed on the drive.217 Specifically, the government would need 
to be able to show that a file did exist, either because it knew the account’s 
name or because it knew “that (1) the file existed in some specific location, 
(2) the file is possessed by the target of the subpoena, and (3) the file is 
authentic.”218
4. In re Decryption of a Seized Storage System (Feldman)
In In re Decryption of a Seized Storage System219 (Feldman), the 
prosecution sought to compel the decryption of several external hard drives 
seized during a search of the defendant’s home.220 The government believed 
the devices seized contained child pornography, and the forensic examiners 
were able to determine that they had transferred over 1,000 files over the 
file sharing network E-mule.221 Most of the file names implicated child 
pornography.222
The magistrate adopted the standards set by the other courts, and 
211 Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1347-49. 
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1346 (“[N]othing in the record illustrates that the Government knows with reasonable 
particularity that Doe is even capable of accessing the encrypted portions of the drives.”). 
214 Id. at 1347. 
215 Id. at 1348, 1349 n.27. 
216 Id. at 1348. 
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1349 n.28. 
219 2:13-mj-00449, 2013 BL 153162 (E.D. Wis. Apr., 19 2013), available at http://
ia601700.us.archive.org/6/items/gov.uscourts.wied.63043/gov.uscourts.wied.63043.3.0.pdf.
220 Id. at *1. 
221 Id.
222 Id.
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looked, first, to determine whether the government knew the device had 
content, and, second, whether the defendant could access the device.223 On 
this first point, the court, distinguishing Doe III, found that it was a 
foregone conclusion that the device had contents and that the contents were 
child pornography.224 On the second point however, the court concluded 
that the government could not show that the defendant was able to decrypt 
the device and thus held the government could not compel decryption.225
On reconsideration however, the government was able to present more 
evidence that the defendant was able to access the device.226 This evidence 
was in a somewhat similar form as the evidence the court considered in 
Fricosu and included circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the 
device, thus increasing the likelihood that the defendant could decrypt.227
The court then ordered decryption.228 Litigation on this issue abruptly 
ceased however when the prosecution was able to fully decrypt the 
defendant’s computer, finding over four hundred thousand pictures and 
videos of child pornography.229
III. ANALYSIS
The current collection of compelled decryption cases have some 
general similarities. Almost every major court case has turned on the issue 
of whether the foregone conclusion doctrine applies.230 In other words, in 
these cases, the accused met his or her initial burden of showing that 
decryption was a testimonial act, and the government has sought to show 
that the implicit communications were a foregone conclusion.231
223 Id. at *4. 
224 Id.
225 Id. at *5. 
226 Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013), available at http://
www.courthousenews.com/2013/05/31/decryptorder.pdf.
227 Id. at *2 (“d. In addition to numerous files of child pornography, the decrypted part of 
Feldman’s storage system contains detailed personal financial records and documents belonging to [the 
defendant]. e. The decrypted part of [the defendant’s] storage system contains dozens of personal 
photographs of [the defendant]. . . . [T]he defendant] is a competent software developer who could have 
learned how to use encryption.”) The court did not say it was applying a preponderance of the evidence 
standard to the question of whether the defendant could decrypt. See id. The court did not say what 
evidentiary standard it was applying at all. See id. 
228 Id.
229 See Motion to Dismiss Application, at 1-2, United States v. Decryption of a Seized Data 
Storage System (2:13-mj-00449), available at http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/
X1Q6MM164J82. 
230 See, e.g., In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2008 WL 424718, at *3 (D. Vt. 2009); United States 
v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1347-49 (11th Cir. 
2012); Feldman II, 2:13-mj-00449, 2013 BL 153162, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013). 
231 See Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1984). 
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Not enough care and attention has been paid to what is testimonial 
about decryption—i.e., what decryption implicitly communicates. Courts 
have said that decryption communicates that data is located on an encrypted 
device exist and that the accused controls it.232 This assumption misreads 
the act of production line of cases and fails to take into account the 
seemingly obvious fact that decryption and the physical production of 
documents are different actions. Different actions will implicitly 
communicate different things. 
First, I will argue that decryption communicates that a witness can 
access a device. Second, I will argue that decryption does not communicate 
the existence of a device’s contents or accused’s control over of those 
contents. Therefore, to compel decryption, it must be a foregone conclusion 
that a witness is able to access a device. However, neither existence nor 
control needs to be a foregone conclusion. 
A.  Decryption Communicates that One Has Access to an Encrypted Device 
Decrypting a device necessarily requires one enter a correct 
password.233 Thus if the government seizes an encrypted device, compels 
the accused to decrypt the device, and the accused does so, it necessarily 
means that the accused knows the password and has access to the device.234
This should be enough to establish that decryption is testimonial. 
Boucher I, Doe III, and Feldman explicitly acknowledged that 
decryption communicates one’s ability to access a device.235 This is a 
unique feature of encryption and inapplicable to more “traditional” act of 
production doctrine cases.236 But this divergence is proper. Physically 
producing documents requires a different action than entering a password 
232 See In re Boucher, No: 2:08-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, *5 (D. Va. Nov. 29 2007); Boucher,
2009 WL 424718, at *3; Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1346. The court in Fricosu did not explicitly say that 
decryption had testimonial qualities but instead jumped to the foregone conclusion analysis. Fricosu,
841 F. Supp. 2d at 1237. During its foregone conclusion analysis, it noted that existence and control 
were both foregone conclusions so the court at least assumed that decryption presumptively 
communicated these qualities. Id.; see also id. at 1236 (discussing Boucher and the court’s analysis 
there).
233 See generally section II.A supra.
234 For the purposes of clarity, the general noun used for the one the government is attempting to 
compel will either be the witness, the defendant, or the accused. This is not to indicate that anyone 
compelled to decrypt is necessarily filling one of those roles. 
235 See In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4 (D. Va. Nov. 19, 2007); Doe III,
670 F.3d at 1349; Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013). Fricosu implicitly 
assumed it because it held that the defendant’s ability access the devices was a foregone conclusion. 
Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1237. Boucher II did not conduct a foregone conclusion analysis or say 
whether decryption implicitly communicates an ability to access a device. See Boucher, 2009 WL 
424718, at *3-4. But because a government agent had already watched the defendant enter the password 
in that case, the court most likely thought it a non-issue. 
236 See discussion supra part II.C.i-v. 
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into a computer—different actions will have different implicit 
communications.237 For example, in Hubbell the government sought to 
compel the defendant to physically assemble thousands of documents.238 In 
comparison, in Doe II, the government sought to compel the defendant to 
execute a directive that would provide the government access to potential 
evidence.239 In Hubbell, the defendant communicated that the documents 
existed, were controlled by him, and were authentic.240 In Doe II, all the 
defendant communicated was an ability to write.241 While the end result 
remained the same, the government got access to incriminating documents, 
the defendants’ actions differed significantly and thus made different 
implicit communications. 
This is not to say that because the act of decryption has fundamental 
differences from the act of production that courts should not apply the 
Fisher line of cases. Instead, courts should embrace the differences between 
decryption and production and acknowledge these differences in their 
analysis.
B.  Before the Government May Compel Decryption, the Defendant’s 
Ability to Access the Device Must Be a Foregone Conclusion 
Simply because a witness is able to meet his or her initial burden of 
showing that the act of decryption is testimonial does not mean the analysis 
is over.242 The next step is to consider whether the government can produce 
sufficient evidence to show the defendant’s ability to decrypt is a forgone 
conclusion.243 If the defendant’s ability to decrypt is a foregone conclusion, 
then the defendant would “add little or nothing to the sum total of the 
government’s information by conceding” to the fact that the defendant can 
237 Compare Hubbell v. United States, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (quoting Curcio v. United States, 
354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)) (“It was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of 
‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the 
subpoena.”) with Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 217 (1988) (“[D]irecting the recipient of a communication to do 
something is not an assertion of fact or, at least in this context, a disclosure of information. In its 
testimonial significance, the execution of such a directive is analogous to the production of a 
handwriting sample or voice exemplar: it is a non-testimonial act.”). 
238 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43. 
239 Doe II, 487 U.S. at 204-06. 
240 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45. 
241 See Doe II, 487 U.S. at 217 (describing the execution like a handwriting exemplar); see also 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (saying a handwriting exemplar communicates one’s 
ability to write). 
242 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11; Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1984); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 
1343 n.19 (11th Cir. 2012). 
243 See Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1343 n.19; Feldman II, 2:13-mj-00449, 2013 BL 153162, at *2 (E.D. 
Wis. May 21, 2013); accord Doe I, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13. 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 222 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 222 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
18 - JARONE_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 11:36 PM
792 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:767 
decrypt.244
Courts addressing this issue, in one way or another, have considered 
whether the defendant’s ability to access an encrypted device is a foregone 
conclusion.245 The clearest example of a defendant’s ability to decrypt being 
a foregone conclusion is Boucher where a government agent watched the 
defendant decrypt his computer once before.246 In comparison, in Doe III,
the government put forward no evidence that the defendant was able to 
decrypt.247 Fricosu and Feldman present an interesting middle ground 
where the courts’ decisions were based on circumstantial evidence.248
Once the government shows that the accused’s ability to decrypt is a 
foregone conclusion, then “no constitutional rights are touched.”249
However, courts have also said that the content and control of a device must 
also be a foregone conclusion. But, as I will argue, decryption does not 
communicate content and control and so requiring these things to be a 
foregone conclusion is erroneous. 
C.  Decryption Does Not Communicate the Existence of a
 Device’s Contents 
Along with requiring the government to know that the witness can 
decrypt, every court has required that the government be able to know that 
the device contains information.250 However, decryption communicates 
244 Id.
245 See In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *5-6 (D. Va. Nov. 29 2007); In re 
Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-5 (D. Va. Feb. 19 2007); United States v. Fricosu, 
841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012); Doe III, 670 F.3d 1346-47; Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162, 
at *2. 
246 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *3. 
247 Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1346. 
248 Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1236; Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162, at *2. The Fricosu court
adopted an evidentiary standard where the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant is able to decrypt. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. The Feldman court did not 
follow this evidentiary standard expressly; it did not say what evidentiary standard it was applying. 
Feldman II, 2013 BL 153162, at *2. This Comment is consciously avoiding the question of how much 
knowledge the government must have before something becomes a foregone conclusion. However, I am 
concerned that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard could result in injustice. There is a 
possibility that one could be compelled to decrypt a device that one does not have access to. For 
instance, if there are multiple users to a device, one user could have an inability to access a particular 
area or volume of a device. See Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340 n.9 (“[T]here was no evidence that [the 
defendant] was the only person who had access to his hard drives.”). Holding that person in contempt 
for being unable to do the impossible would result in a serious injustice. Courts should consider 
adopting a “clear and convincing” evidence standard instead. See Aaron M. Clemens, comment, No
Computer Exception to the Constitution: The Fifth Amendment Protects Against Compelled Production 
of an Encrypted Document or Private Key, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2 (2004).
249 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976); Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1346. 
250 See cases cited supra note 224. Despite Doe III being the only case where the court upheld the 
defendant’s claim of privilege against self-incrimination, courts are not necessarily split on the issue. See
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nothing about the device’s contents. If there are no communications as to 
the contents of a device, the government should not need to know about it. 
Decryption is different than physically producing documents. This is 
perhaps an obvious point—but an important one nonetheless—because 
different actions will implicitly communicate different things. Entering in a 
password to decrypt will implicitly communicate something different from 
physically going out and searching for documents and producing them in 
response to a subpoena. 
This premise is rooted in the Supreme Court’s cases.251 In Hubbell and 
Fisher, the Court indicated that production of documents implicitly 
communicates that the documents existed and the accused controlled the 
documents.252 Importantly though, it was the means by which the accused 
would produce the documents that communicated existence and control.253
The Court in Hubbell put great weight on the fact that the accused would 
have had to “make extensive use ‘of the contents of his own mind’ in 
identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the 
subpoena.”254 The “assembly” of the documents resulted in the act being 
testimonial.255 Conversely, in Doe II, the accused did not need to go out and 
assemble any documents—he just executed a directive—and so the accused 
did not implicitly communicate existence and control of the documents to 
the government.256
Decryption is more like executing a release for foreign bank records 
than the assembly of documents.257 In both executing a release and 
decryption, the accused is not required to use the contents of his mind to 
Feldman I, No. 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL 116993, *3 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013). Whether an act is 
testimonial depends on the “facts and circumstances of particular cases.” Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. At 
least on this point, the legal rule has not differed significantly between courts, instead the “facts and 
circumstances” have differed. It is, for example, altogether possible that courts in the Eleventh Circuit 
would permit compelled decryption should a case be factually similar to Boucher or Fricosu. See Doe 
III, 670 F.3d at 1348-49 (distinguishing Boucher and Fricosu and adopting a similar rule as those cases 
in dicta). 
251 See Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The forced execution of this 
document differs from the forced production of physical evidence just as human beings differ from other 
animals.”).
252 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000). 
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. (“The assembly of those documents was like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall 
safe, not like being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox.”) (emphasis added); see also Cole, supra
note 75, at 182 (“The Court concluded that the mental efforts required by a witness to assemble and 
produce subpoenaed documents was like testifying to the combination to a wall safe . . . .”). 
256 Doe II, 487 U.S. at 215. 
257 See id.; see also Philip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 204 (1997) (noting an analogy between decryption and executing a directive). 
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assemble anything.258 Also in both cases, the accused does some physical 
act to give the government access to the information.259 The accused in no 
way “points” the government to incriminating information but allows the 
government to use “the independent labor of its officers” to conduct the 
investigation.260 The government, after compelling the accused to decrypt, 
does not force the accused to go through huge amounts of data and identify 
incriminating evidence—that would bring it much more in line with 
Hubbell.
Consider the following. Decryption generally requires one to enter a 
password into a device to make it readable.261 However, technology is also 
available which allows one to lock a device biometrically (e.g., fingerprint 
locking).262 If the government sought to compel decryption of a 
biometrically locked device, it could do so without implicating the Fifth 
Amendment.263 Decryption using a biometric lock would involve a purely 
physical act, no different really than compelling someone to provide a 
blood sample or stand in a line up for identification.264 In other words, it 
would be a non-testimonial act.265 It would no more communicate what was 
within an encrypted device than providing a DNA sample would 
communicate a DNA sequence.266
If a court would find that using a biometrical lock does not implicitly 
communicate the contents of a device, then it should also find that entering 
a password does not implicitly communicate the contents of a device. In 
neither case is the accused required to identify or collect evidence against 
258 See Reitinger, supra note 257, at 177-78 (“[E]ncryption is far more like storing a document 
on a computer or locking it in a safe than translating it. . . . Encryption . . . is a purely mechanistic 
process that does not of necessity add, subtract, or alter information . . . .”) (footnotes omitted). 
259 Id.
260 See Doe II, 487 U.S. at 215. 
261 See generally Section II.A. 
262 See, e.g., Fingerprint Lock Free, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.nb.fingerprint.lock.free (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) (fingerprint lock on Android phone); 
iOS Fingerprint Lock Screen, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.creativeinc.iphone5s.fingerprint.lockscreen&hl=en (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) 
(fingerprint lock on iPhone); Iron Key F200 Flash Drives, IRON KEY, http://www.ironkey.com/en-US/
encrypted-storage-drives/f200.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) (fingerprint lock on USB drive). See
generally Colin Soutar et al., Biometric Encryption, in ICSA GUIDE TO CRYPTOGRAPHY (Randal K. 
Nicols ed. 1999).
263 See Marcia Hofmann, Apple’s Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can’t ‘Take the Fifth’, WIRED




266 Providing a DNA sample is a non-testimonial act. See, e.g., United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 
766, 774 (7th Cir. 2006). Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that a blood sample 
is non-testimonial). 
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himself or herself but instead is required to allow the government to read 
the device.267
The major distinguishing feature between decryption and executing the 
bank records is that, as I have already discussed, decryption implicitly 
communicates that the accused has access to the device. But the directive in 
Doe II was carefully written as to not communicate that the accused had 
access to the foreign bank accounts.268
This distinction goes away when the accused’s ability to access the 
device is a foregone conclusion. The Supreme Court said the execution of 
the directive in Doe II was like a handwriting exemplar.269 The Court has 
also said that an exemplar has testimonial qualities, but that these 
testimonial qualities are almost always a foregone conclusion.270 Thus if it 
is a foregone conclusion that one is able to decrypt, then the act of 
decryption is really no different, at least in testimonial value, from a 
handwriting exemplar. 
D.  Decryption Does Not Communicate Possession or Control of a Device 
Decryption of a device does not communicate either that one has 
control of contents of a device or possession of a device. In Fisher, one 
necessarily had to have possession or control over the subpoenaed 
documents to produce them for the government.271 However, decryption is 
distinct in several ways. First, someone using encryption can tell someone 
else the password to one’s encrypted device. That third-party can certainly 
decrypt but does not necessarily have control or possession of the device. 
Second, usually in these decryption cases, the government possesses and 
controls the device because it was seized. The accused does not have 
control over the device but instead can access it. Third, in Doe II, the 
Supreme Court never required the government to know that the defendant 
had control of the foreign bank records before compelling the execution of 
the directive.272 Similarly, in entering in a password, one does not implicitly 
say that one has control over the device’s contents. 
267 See Phillip R. Reitinger, supra note 257, at 177-78. 
268 Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 215 (1988). 
269 Id. at 217. 
270 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). 
271 See id. at 410. It would be, generally, quite unlikely that a normal citizen could produce 
someone else’s tax records because the citizen does not possess or control them.
272 Doe II, 487 U.S. at 215. 
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E.  If Decryption Did Communicate Contents and Control, then the Lower 
Courts’ Analysis Would Still Be Flawed 
Even assuming that decryption did communicate the contents of a 
device, lower courts are incorrectly applying Supreme Court precedent. If 
decryption did communicate content, then compelled decryption would be 
very much like a categorical request for documents. This sort of categorical 
request was rejected in Hubbell.273
The Eleventh Circuit, for instance, adopted a rule requiring that the 
government know of the existence of some files before compelling 
decryption.274 But the government, in these cases, is seeking decryption of 
the entire device—not the production of certain files.275 The Eleventh 
Circuit seems to be saying that so long as the government has knowledge of 
some files it can compel the decryption of the entire device.276 The Supreme 
Court in Hubbell did not say that if the government knew of the existence 
of some documents, it could successfully compel the production of an entire 
category of documents.277 The lower court’s analysis, if applied consistently 
with Hubbell, would permit unconstitutional fishing expeditions.278
A consistent application of Hubbell would require the defendant to 
produce specific files and not the entire content of a device. Alternatively, 
courts should require a comprehensive listing of every file on a device, or 
require the prosecution provide use and derivational use immunity for those 
files it does not know about prior to compelling decryption. Fortunately 
however, these remedies are not necessary because the premise that 
decryption communicates contents is incorrect. 
IV. A NEW ACT OF DECRYPTION DOCTRINE
I have argued that decryption implicitly communicates that one is able 
to decrypt but does not communicate the contents of a device or one’s 
control of a device. Following from this, if the witness’s ability to decrypt is 
273 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44-45 (2000). 
274 Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1349 n.28 (11th Cir. 2012). 
275 Id. at 1339; United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1238 (D. Colo. 2012); Feldman
II, No. 2:13-mj-00449-WEC, 2013 BL 116993 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013). 
276 Id. at 1249 n.28. 
277 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45 (“[T]he Government has not shown that it had any prior knowledge 
of either the existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents ultimately produced by 
respondent.”); see also Cole, supra note 75, at 185 (arguing that a broad request for documents became 
more difficult under Hubbell because there is a greater burden on the government to show knowledge of 
the documents). 
278 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42; see In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 (Nov. 29, 
2007) (“By compelling entry of the password the government would be compelling production of all the 
files on [the device], both known and unknown. . . . [T]he files the government has not seen could add 
much to the sum total of the government’s information.”). 
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a foregone conclusion, then decryption is a non-testimonial act. This non-
testimonial act would allow the government to gain access to a potential 
source of information, but would not assist the government in locating or 
compiling evidence. 
I suggest a two part analysis. First, courts should ask whether the act of 
decryption is presumptively privileged. As discussed in part III.A, the act of 
entering the password is generally going to be testimonial—it implicitly 
communicates an ability to access the device. 
For the privilege to attach however, decryption must also be compelled 
and incriminating. In some cases, decryption may not be compelled. For 
example, one can voluntarily decrypt either during custodial interrogation279
or during a grand jury proceeding.280 Similarly, one’s act of decryption is 
not always incriminating. If the danger of self-incrimination is “imagined 
and unsubstantial,” then the government has the power to compel a 
testimonial act.281 For example, if the defendant has child pornography on 
his or her computer and a witness saw the defendant enter in the password, 
the witness could be compelled to decrypt the device because there would 
be no danger that decryption would incriminate the witness. Alternatively, 
if the government grants immunity for the act of decryption, then one’s act 
is no longer incriminatory and can be compelled. 
If the defendant can meet the initial burden of showing that decryption 
is (1) testimonial, (2) compelled, and (3) incriminatory, then the privilege 
against self-incrimination attaches. However, as the Court in Doe I stated,
the government then can offer evidence to show that the defendant’s ability 
to decrypt is a foregone conclusion. If the government can meet this burden, 
then, it may compel the witness to decrypt the device because decryption 
would not increase the “sum total” of the government’s knowledge. 
One could argue that the act of decryption analysis above may permit 
the government to compel decryption as part of fishing expeditions. In other 
words, because the government is not required to know anything about the 
contents of a device, it could compel decryption and ransack the device 
should one’s ability to decrypt be a foregone conclusion. This would 
implicate privacy interests along with granting the government an 
overbroad power to search one’s personal, digital effects. 
In response, the discussion here is just in regard to the Fifth 
279 An example of this occurred when the defendant in Boucher entered in the password to his 
laptop after waiving his Miranda Rights. 
280 Cf. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984) (holding a communication at a grand jury 
proceeding is voluntary if one incriminates oneself but does not assert a privilege against self-
incrimination).
281 Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 
39, 88 (1968). 
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Amendment. There are other protections and parts of the Constitution; the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is just one 
check against government power.282 The Fourth Amendment for example 
still restrains the government’s ability to search one’s digital devices.283
Additionally, the Fifth Amendment’s concern is not that of privacy.284 The 
Court has recognized that the government’s access to a person’s papers is 
mostly unfettered regardless of a paper’s personal nature so long as the 
Fourth Amendment requirements are met.285 Similarly, having private 
information contained on a computer is irrelevant for a Fifth Amendment 
analysis.
V. AN UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM: THE ACCUSED’S REFUSAL TO DECRYPT
As this Comment argues, the law is equipped to adjudicate whether a 
282 Cf. Doe II, 487 U.S. 201, 214 (1988) (“[I]t should be remembered that there are many 
restrictions on the government’s prosecutorial practices in addition to the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
Indeed, there are other protections against governmental efforts to compel an unwilling suspect to 
cooperate in an investigation, including efforts to obtain information from him. We are confident that 
these provisions, together with the Self-Incrimination Clause, will continue to prevent abusive 
investigative techniques.”) (footnotes omitted). 
283 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see John E. D. Larkin, Compelled Production of 
Encrypted Data, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L 253, 258 (2012). See generally Orin S. Kerr, Searches and 
Seizures in A Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005) (discussing ways of analyzing the searches 
of computers). 
284 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1976) (“The proposition that the Fifth 
Amendment protects private information obtained without compelling self-incriminating testimony is 
contrary to the clear statements of this Court that under appropriate safeguards private incriminating 
statements of an accused may be overheard and used in evidence, if they are not compelled at the time 
they were uttered, and that disclosure of private information may be compelled if immunity removes the 
risk of incrimination. If the Fifth Amendment protected generally against the obtaining of private 
information from a man’s mouth or pen or house, its protections would presumably not be lifted by 
probable cause and a warrant or by immunity. The privacy invasion is not mitigated by immunity; and 
the Fifth Amendment’s strictures, unlike the Fourth’s, are not removed by showing reasonableness. The 
Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in the Fourth Amendment. They struck a 
balance so that when the State’s reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes 
sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue. 
They did not seek in still another Amendment the Fifth to achieve a general protection of privacy but to 
deal with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination.”); see In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s more recent opinions indicate that Boyd’s foundations have eroded. The Court no longer views 
the Fifth Amendment as a general protector of privacy or private information, but leaves that role to the 
Fourth Amendment. . . . Self-incrimination analysis now focuses on whether the creation of the thing 
demanded was compelled and, if not, whether the act of producing it would constitute compelled 
testimonial communication.”); Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 610 n.6 (1984); Terzian, supra note 1, at 307. 
285 See cases cited supra note 284. I say mostly because other privileges may apply. For example, 
attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, or perhaps some kind of exception applying to national 
security.
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 226 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 226 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
18 - JARONE_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 11:36 PM
2015] An Act of Decryption Doctrine 799 
defendant may be compelled to decrypt. The law, however, is not equipped 
to address what happens after the compulsion. The accused in such 
situations faces two possibilities: decrypt and allow the government access 
to the evidence or not decrypt and face contempt of court.286 While a 
defendant in contempt can be incarcerated, the device remains encrypted. 
This hinders law enforcement’s ability to use the contents of the device to 
investigate further crimes such as during a child pornography investigation 
where the government is seeking the child pornography distributor. 
When one is compelled to decrypt, one could say that he or she forgot 
the password. The defendant in Fricosu, after the court ordered her to 
decrypt her device, “claimed” to have forgotten the password.287 Whether 
that claim is true or not is nearly impossible to determine, but the more time 
that passes, the more likely it is to become true. If the defendant cannot 
remember the password and can no longer decrypt, then the coercive 
purpose of contempt would become inapplicable. Holding such a person in 
contempt would do nothing more than coerce him or her to do something 
that he or she is unable to accomplish, possibly opening up a defense of 
impossibility.288
One may choose contempt over decryption to avoid conviction for a 
sufficiently serious crime.289 One scholar has suggested a missing witness 
instruction as a means to deal with the problem of a refusal to decrypt.290
This suggestion could help solve the problem of a refusal to decrypt in 
some cases but not all. For example, in a case where the specific nature of 
the records is important to investigate a crime, a missing witness instruction 
may not be helpful. Also, the content of a drive may be important to future 
investigations, such as finding the distributor of child pornography. 
Alternatively, in a situation where there are national security risks, 
prosecution is of secondary importance to decryption and preventing 
catastrophe.
Some have argued for increased regulation of encryption 
technology.291 First of all, this argument has First Amendment problems.292
286 See Larkin, supra note 283, at 276. 
287 David Kravets, Defendant Ordered to Decrypt Laptop May Have Forgotten Password,
WIRED, (Feb. 06, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/02/forgotten-password/; Doe
III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir. 2012) (defendant claiming in the alternative that he forgot the 
password to his device). 
288 See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966) (“[T]he justification for coercive 
imprisonment as applied to civil contempt depends upon the ability of the contemnor to comply with the 
court’s order.”); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75 (1948). 
289 See Larkin, supra note 283, at 276. 
290 Id.
291 See Chase Bates, comment, Unbreakable: The Fifth Amendment and Computer Passwords,
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1293, 1313 (2012). See generally D. Forest Wolfe, The Government’s Right to Read: 
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But as a more practical matter, the nature of online distribution and the 
existence of free and open source encryption software make strict regulation 
a losing proposition.293
Regardless, for all this discussion of compelled decryption, courts may 
be better off not going down the compelled decryption road. Instead, the 
solution to these problems lies in technological advancements in 
cryptology, computer science, and law enforcement techniques. 
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Between writing the Comment and being selected for publication, 
another important compelled decryption case was decided, Commonwealth
v. Gelfgatt.294 Gelfgatt, a 6-2 decision holding the Commonwealth could 
compel decryption, displays the importance carefully considering the 
differences between the product of documents and decryption.295
In this case, the defendant was accused of several counts of forgery, 
fraud, and larceny. He had encrypted several electronic storage devices.296
The Commonwealth believed evidence of the defendant’s crimes could be 
found on those devices.297 The defendant had informed law enforcement 
that the devices were encrypted and that he could decrypt, but he refused to 
do so.298
The Massachusetts Supreme Court’s analysis follows that of Doe III,
Boucher, and Fricosu (though includes few citations to those cases).299
First, it determined that “at first blush” entering in the password is 
Maintaining State Access to Digital Data in the Age of Impenetrable Encryption, 49 EMORY L.J. 711 
(2000).
292 See Adam C. Bonin, comment, Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amendment Challenges 
to Cryptography Regulation, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 505-08 (1996); Robert Post, Encryption
Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713 (Spring 2000); Elizabeth Lauzon, 
note, The Philip Zimmermann Investigation: The Start of the Fall of Export Restrictions on Encryption 
Software Under First Amendment Free Speech Issues, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1307, 1337-51 (1998); see
also Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Because computer source code is an 
expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about computer programming, we hold that 
it is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
293 See Paul Zimmerman, Why I Wrote PGP, http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/ (last 
visited on Feb. 13, 2014) (“If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy. . . . PGP empowers 
people to take their privacy into their own hands. There has been a growing social need for it. That’s 
why I wrote it.”). 
294 11 N.E.3d 605 (Mass. 2014). 
295 See id. at 617. The court also held compelled production did not offend the state constitution. 
See id. at 616-17. 
296 Id. at 608. 
297 Id. at 611. 
298 Id. at 610-11 
299 In fact, the majority only cites Fricosu and the dissent cites both Doe III (favorably) and 
Fricosu (unfavorably). 
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sufficiently communicative to trigger Fifth Amendment protection.300
However, it stated the foregone conclusion exception permitted decryption 
if the government could show that it knew “(1) the existence of the 
evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence by the 
defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence.”301 The court concluded 
that these facts were a foregone conclusion, in part, because of the 
defendant’s own statements indicating he could decrypt if he wanted to.302
Although the court does not say it clearly, it does seem to indicate that it is 
sufficient that the government knew that: (1) the defendant had control over 
the devices; (2) the device was encrypted, and (3) the defendant knew the 
encryption key.303
Curiously missing from the majority’s analysis is a discussion of the 
government’s knowledge as to the existence of evidence on the device and 
the defendant’s control over that evidence.304 In fact, the dissent criticizes 
the majority saying, 
[T]he court adopts the Commonwealth’s contention that, by decrypting 
the computers and thereby producing their unencrypted contents, the 
defendant would be asserting only his ability to decrypt the devices. 
On this view, he would not be asserting that he owned them, had 
exclusive use and control of them, or was familiar with any files on 
them; that certain files contained the incriminating evidence sought; or 
that the documents were authentic.305
Here, the dissent is correct in recognizing that, notwithstanding the 
majority’s own characterization of the rule, the majority was focused on 
whether it was a foregone conclusion that the defendant could decrypt and 
not the other act of production doctrine requirements. 
As this Comment argues, decryption does not implicitly communicate 
exclusive use, control, or familiarity with files contained within a device. If 
the production of physical documents were anything like compelled 
decryption, the dissent would be correct to chastise the majority. But it is 
not. 
300 Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 614. 
301 Id.
302 See id. at 615. 
303 See id.
304 See id. at 615-16. 
305 See Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 618 (Lenk, J., dissenting). The dissent took issue with the 
insufficiency of the government’s knowledge as to what was contained within the encrypted devices. 
See id. at 620-21. The dissent would require the government to have particular knowledge of what a 
device contains. Id. at 622-23. The dissent fails to consider (and does not even cite) Doe II where the 
United States Supreme Court held that opening up a potential source of evidence does not implicitly 
communicate anything about that source of evidence. See generally id.
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The confused analysis in this case displays the need for a more careful 
consideration of the act of production doctrine’s relationship to compelled 
decryption. The majority’s decision was messy, but perhaps the reason it 
was messy is that it would not make sense to strictly apply the act of 
production doctrine to compelled decryption cases without recognizing the 
differences between decryption and production. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the lower courts are applying the 
Supreme Court’s act of production doctrine improperly. The courts have 
failed to recognize that the witness is not, himself, producing anything at 
all—not in the same way that a defendant produced things in Hubbell,
Fisher, and Doe I. Rather, the witness is typing in a password. So long as it 
is a foregone conclusion that the witness knows the password, the 
government should be able to compel the witness to enter it. Because the 
lower courts have misapplied the doctrine, they have provided greater 
protection for encryption users than what the Constitution requires. This 
Comment’s intent is not to advocate for a limitation on an individual’s 
interest in not incriminating himself or herself but to assist in the creation of 
a clear rule for when the privilege does or does not apply. 
In the end, should someone not wish to decrypt, the government 
cannot do much to get access to the encrypted material. Although this 
Comment has argued for clarification in the law, I am unconvinced that the 
law will have much to do with battling the growing problem with 
encryption. Judges, prosecutors, academics, and Congress will not solve 
this problem; cryptographers, forensic investigators, computer scientists, 
and law enforcement will solve the problem. 
